








































Alternative	 for	 Germany	 (AfD)	 entered	 parliament	 for	 the	 first	 time	 after	
substantially	 increasing	 its	 vote	 share	 from	 the	 previous	 legislative	 election	 of	
2013.	 These	 results	 attracted	 extensive	 media	 attention,	 generating	 talk	 of	 a	
‘populist	revolution’	which	is	seen	as	part	of	a	continuing	trend	that	follows	the	
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This	 article	 reviews	 the	 results	of	 electoral	 contests	 that	 took	place	 in	2017	 in	
France,	 Norway,	 Bulgaria,	 the	 UK,	 the	 Netherlands,	 Austria,	 Germany	 and	 the	
Czech	 Republic,	 and	 examines	 them	 in	 comparative	 perspective.	 A	 detailed	
analysis,	 which	 takes	 into	 account	 important	 variations	 both	 across	 countries	
and	across	 time,	 indicates	 that	 the	 results	are	not	 straightforward.	 Specifically,	
by	focusing	on	these	variations	this	article	argues	that:	(1)	Right-wing	populism	
is	not	a	uniform	phenomenon.	What	we	term	‘right-wing	populist’	parties	are	in	
fact	 a	 range	 of	 parties	 that	 differ	 fundamentally	 in	 terms	 of	 their	 rhetoric	 and	





term	 right-wing	 populist	 parties,	 have	 been	 contesting	 elections	 in	 Europe	 for	
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the	past	30	years,	often	successfully,	 including	the	FPÖ,	List	Pim	Fortuyn	(LPF)	
and	 the	PVV,	and	 the	FN.	 Support	has	 tended	 to	vary	across	 time,	 country	and	
election	 type;	 (3)	While	 not	 new,	 this	 phenomenon	 does	 pose	 new	 challenges.	
These	 are	 linked	 to	 supply-side,	 rather	 than	 demand-side,	 dynamics.	 In	 most	
Western	European	countries,	the	parties	that	are	increasingly	enjoying	the	most	
success	 are	 those	 that	 are	 attempting	 to	 distance	 themselves	 from	 fascism,	
‘speak’	 the	 language	 of	 democracy,	 and	 stress	 ‘liberal	 values’	 to	 justify	 their	
exclusionary	agendas	(Halikiopoulou	et	al.,	2013).	This	makes	them	more	able	to	
permeate	 mainstream	 ground	 and	 influence	 the	 policy	 agenda;	 and	 (4)	 the	
results	 from	 Eastern	 Europe	 are	 more	 mixed.	 On	 the	 one	 hand	 the	 overall	
pattern	 there	 is	 one	of	 ‘authoritarianism,	 territorial	 revisionism	and	 the	 threat	
from	 territorial	 minorities’	 (Muis	 and	 Immerzeel,	 2017).	 However,	 the	 2017	






First,	 it	 is	 important	 to	 place	 the	 results	 of	 2017	within	 a	 broader	 theoretical	
framework.	 Since	 the	 2014	 ‘earthquake’	 EP	 elections	 (Halikiopoulou	 and	
Vasilopoulou,	2014),	the	electoral	fortunes	of	parties	that	advocate	immigration	
restrictions	 on	 the	 basis	 of	 a	 narrative	 that	 stresses	 popular	 sovereignty	 and	
anti-elitism	have	increasingly	attracted	academic	interest.	Such	parties	include	a	
number	of	those	that	competed	in	the	various	2017	elections	such	as	the	FN,	the	
PVV,	 UKIP	 and	 the	 AfD;	 and	 others	 such	 as	 the	 Greek	 Golden	 Dawn	 (GD),	 the	
Danish	 People’s	 Party	 (DF),	 the	 Swedish	 Democrats	 (SD)	 and	 the	 True	 Finns.	
While	 terminology	varies,	 ranging	 from	 ‘radical	 right’	 (Immerzeel	 et	 al.,	 2015),	
‘far	 right’	 (Halikiopoulou	 and	 Vlandas,	 2016)	 and	 ‘extreme	 right’	 (Arzheimer,	
2009),	 the	 term	 ‘right-wing	populism’	 or	 ‘populist	 radical	 right’	 is	 increasingly	
employed	 to	 describe	 these	 parties	 (e.g.	Muis	 and	 Immerzeel,	 2017;	 Rooduijn,	
2017).	The	focus	 is	on	two	central	 features	that	 the	parties	share:	an	emphasis	
on	 popular	 sovereignty	 and	 an	 emphasis	 on	 national	 sovereignty;	 or	 in	 other	





and	 ‘them’	 the	 corrupt	 elites	 (Mudde,	2004).	 Second,	nationalism	 is	 a	 vision	of	
society	that	prioritises	the	unity,	autonomy	and	identity	of	the	nation	(Breuilly,	
2005),	 focusing	 on	 a	 sharp	 division	 between	 in-	 groups	 and	 out-groups.	What	
makes	 these	 parties	 nationalist	 is	 their	 shared	 focus	 on	 national	 homogeneity,	
sovereignty,	 and	 the	 espousal	 of	 anti-immigration	 policies	 resting	 on	 the	






problematic.	The	danger	 is	 that	we	may	be	 lumping	very	different	phenomena	
within	 the	 same	 category.	 While	 an	 anti-elite	 rhetoric	 and	 immigration	
scepticism	are	common	among	many	of	these	parties,	much	more	divides	them,	
including	 their	 degree	 of	 extremism,	 the	 extent	 to	 which	 they	 adopt	 violence,	
their	 relationship	 with	 fascism,	 their	 position	 on	 social	 issues	 and	 state	
intervention	 of	 the	 economy	 as	 well	 as	 their	 voting	 base	 (Halikiopoulou	 and	






assessments	of	why	these	parties	are	 increasing	 their	electoral	support.	 If	 they	
indeed	 differ	 in	 kind,	 then	 their	 rise	 cannot	 be	 traceable	 to	 a	 single	 cause	
(Pappas,	 2016).	 For	 example,	 parties	 such	 as	 the	 Dutch	 PVV,	 the	 Bulgarian	
ATAKA	 and	 the	Greek	Golden	Dawn	differ	 fundamentally	 from	 each	 other	 and	
are	 elected	 on	 different	 platforms.	While,	 therefore,	 it	 is	 important	 to	 identify	
trends	and	patterns,	we	can	only	do	so	if	we	can	first	ensure	comparability.	It	is	
also	important	to	disaggregate	between	the	populist	and	nationalist	attributes	of	







on	 right-wing	 populism,	 this	 article	 proceeds	 to	 examine	 the	 2017	 election	
results	 in	 comparative	 perspective.	 Most	 right-wing	 populist	 parties	 that	
competed	in	the	various	electoral	contests	that	took	place	across	Europe	in	2017	
increased	their	support.	These	include	the	FN,	the	PVV,	the	AfD,	and	the	FPÖ.	The	
Czech	 SPD,	 which	 ran	 for	 the	 first	 time,	 also	 achieved	 a	 good	 result.	 The	 FN	
competed	in	the	second	round	of	the	Presidential	election	for	the	first	time	since	
2002,	 receiving	 its	 highest	 ever	 percentage	 of	 33.9%	 in	 that	 round.	 The	 PVV	
received	 13.1%	of	 the	 votes	 cast,	 increasing	 its	 representation	 by	 5	 seats.	 The	
FPÖ	received	26%	of	the	votes	cast	and	formed	a	coalition	government	with	the	
centre-right	 OVP.	 In	 Germany	 the	 AfD	 entered	 parliament	 with	 12.6%	 of	 the	
votes	cast	and	94	seats.	The	party	came	third,	managing	to	draw	voters	from	all	




On	 the	other	hand,	 in	 the	UK,	Bulgaria	and	Norway	right-wing	populist	parties	
declined.	In	the	UK,	UKIP	decreased	its	electoral	support	from	12.6%	in	2015	to	
1.8%	 in	2017.	 In	Bulgaria,	 the	Bulgarian	Patriotic	 Front	 -	 a	 nationalist	 alliance	
between	 the	 National	 Front	 for	 the	 Salvation	 for	 Bulgaria,	 ATAKA	 and	 the	
National	 Movement	 (IMRO-BNM)	 –	 received	 9.07%	 of	 the	 votes	 cast	 in	 2017.	
This	 percentage	 is	 smaller	 compared	 to	 the	 11.83-combined	 percentage	 that	
three	parties	 received	 in	20141.	 In	Norway,	 the	Norwegian	Progress	Party	also	
declined,	but	 just	marginally	 from	16.3%	 in	2013	 to	15.2%	 in	2017	 losing	 two	
seats.	 However,	 the	 loss	 was	 smaller	 than	 expected	 as	 Progress	 Party	 leaders	
feared	 that	 they	 would	 lose	 support	 from	 anti-establishment	 voters	 having	





The	 snapshot	 of	 the	 2017	 results	 offered	 above	 indeed	 illustrates	 that	 the	
majority	of	right-wing	populist	parties	that	competed	across	Europe	performed	
well.	 An	 examination	 of	 the	 performance	 of	 the	 same	 parties	 across	 time,	
however,	indicates	that	this	phenomenon	is	neither	linear	nor	new.	First,	a	look	
at	the	wider	picture	illustrates	that	indeed	the	events	of	2017	can	be	interpreted	
as	 part	 of	 a	 broader	 trend	 that	 commenced	 in	 the	 mid	 1980s.	 As	 Figure	 1	
illustrates,	 since	 then	 the	 electoral	performance	of	 such	parties	has	 fluctuated:	





A	 turn	 to	 specific	 parties	 reveals	 a	 similar	 picture.	 With	 regards	 to	 the	 cases	
where	 there	 was	 an	 increase	 in	 electoral	 support	 during	 2017	 elections,	 the	
longer-term	 analysis	 shows	 that	 these	 increases	 are	 not	 unprecedented.	 In	
France,	for	example,	FN	performance	has	fluctuated	significantly	since	the	1980s	
and	 has	 varied	 across	 election	 type.	 With	 regards	 to	 parliamentary	 elections	
since	1993:	 the	highest	percentage	 the	party	has	 received	 in	 the	 first	 round	 is	
15.25%	 in	1997;	 the	 lowest	 is	4.9%	 in	2007.	 In	 the	second	round,	percentages	










With	 regards	 to	 Presidential	 elections,	 since	 1995	 the	 party	 has	 progressed	 to	
the	second	round	twice:	in	2002	and	in	2017.	In	round	1	the	lowest	percentage	
the	party	has	received	was	10.44%	in	2007;	and	the	highest	was	21.3%	in	2017.	
In	 the	 second	 round,	 the	 party	 received	 17.79%	of	 the	 votes	 cast	 in	 2002	 and	
33.9%	 in	 2017.	 This	 is	 the	 highest	 percentage	 the	 party	 has	 received	 and	 it	 is	










the	 following	 year.	 The	 PVV’s	 highest	 percentage	 is	 15.45%,	 received	 in	 2010.	
The	 party	 subsequently	 decreased	 its	 support	 in	 2012	 with	 10.08%,	 which	 it	





The	 FPÖ	 follows	 a	 similar	 pattern.	 Figure	 5	 traces	 the	 party’s	 performance	 in	

















While	 this	 phenomenon	 is	 not	 necessarily	 new,	 the	 electoral	 fortunes	 of	 these	
parties	 do	 represent	 a	 new	 challenge	 with	 regards	 to	 their	 progressive	
entrenchment	 in	 their	 respective	 political	 systems.	 Parties	 are	 in	 many	 ways	
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themselves	 independent	 variables,	 determining	 their	 own	 electoral	 fortunes	
(Mudde,	2010).	A	closer	look	at	the	parties	themselves,	their	narratives	and	their	
programmatic	agendas,	points	 to	 interesting	supply-side	patterns.	Both	within-
country	 variations	 and	 variations	 across	 time	 reveal	 a	 similar	 trend:	 in	 their	
majority,	 the	parties	most	 likely	 to	 fare	well	 electorally	 in	Western	Europe	are	
those	 that	 have	 (at	 least	 seemingly)	 distanced	 themselves	 from	 fascism	 and	
racism	 in	 their	 programmatic	 agendas	 in	 favour	 of	 a	 narrative	 that	 stresses	
ideological	 rather	 than	 biological	 rationalisations	 of	 national	 belonging.	 While	
they	 are	 still	 nationalist,	 and	 offer	 ‘nationalist	 solutions’	 to	 all	 socio-economic	
problems	 (Vasilopoulou	 and	Halikiopoulou,	 2015),	 they	 identify	 the	 out-group	








competed	 both	 in	 the	 2013	 and	 the	 2017	 elections	 include	 the	 AfD	 and	 the	
National	Democratic	Party	of	Germany	 (NDP).	 In	both	 elections	 it	was	 the	AfD	
rather	than	the	extreme	right	National	Democratic	Party	of	Germany	(NDP)	that	








a	 populist	 radical	 right	 party,	 it	 is	 ‘indeed	 located	 at	 the	 far-right	 end	 of	
Germany’s	political	spectrum	because	of	its	nationalism,	its	stance	against	state	




‘appeared	 to	 subscribe	 to	 the	 principles	 of	 free	 movement	 and	 free	 choice	 of	
residence	 for	 all	 EU	 citizens,	 although	 it	 wants	 to	 limit	 benefits	 (of	 which	 the	
party	 is	 critical	 in	 general)	 to	 long-term	 residents	 and	 their	 offspring’	
(Arzheimer,	 2015,	 p.	 546).	 The	AfD,	 therefore,	 is	 not	 a	 straightforward	 case	 of	
‘nativism’	 (Arzheimer,	 2015).	 The	 party	 is	 however,	 nationalist	 as	 discussed	
above.	 Its	 2017	 electoral	 campaign	 makes	 this	 point	 clear	 indicating	 that	 the	
party	 adopts	 a	 civic	 form	 of	 nationalism:	 an	 opposition	 to	 Islam	 and	Muslims,	
which	 the	 party	 portrays	 as	 a	 threat	 to	 democracy,	 tolerance	 and	 liberalism.	
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While	the	AfD	is	not	nativist	because	it	doesn’t	exclude	on	the	basis	of	ascriptive	
criteria,	 it	 is	 nationalist	 because	 it	 defines	 the	 out-group	 and	 justifies	 its	
exclusion	on	the	basis	of	ideology.		
	
Second,	 the	 French	 case	 is	 interesting	 because	 it	 allows	 us	 to	 make	 this	
observation	across	time.	The	FN	has	increased	its	electoral	support	substantially	
after	Marine	Le	Pen	took	over	the	party’s	leadership	from	her	father.	Marine	Le	
Pen	 has	 reached	 a	 broader	 electoral	 base	 that	 captures	 ‘younger’	 votes	 (e.g.	
Stockemer	 and	 Amengay,	 2015)	 and	 achieves	 a	 closing	 of	 the	 far-right	 gender	
gap	 in	 France	 (Mayer,	 2015).	 What	 is	 distinctive	 about	 Marine	 Le	 Pen’s	
leadership	is	her	strategy	of	‘de-demonization’	of	the	party	and	a	‘softening	of	its	
rhetoric’	 (Mayer,	 2015;	 Ivaldi,	 2015).	 This	 process	 has	 included	 a	 shift	 of	
emphasis	from	préférence	to	priorité	nationale	in	order	to	disassociate	the	party	
from	 the	 negative	 connotations	 of	 Jean-Marie	 Le	 Pen’s	 rhetoric	 and	 create	
distance	 from	the	party’s	 reputation	 for	exclusionist	discrimination	 (Alduy	and	
Wahnich,	2015).	There	are	similarities	here	with	the	AfD:	an	attempt	to	exclude	
the	out-group	on	the	basis	of	toleration:	i.e.	to	exclude	those	who	are	‘intolerant	




We	may	place	 these	 two	case	studies	within	a	broader	European	 trend.	Across	
Western	 Europe,	 right-wing	 populist	 parties	 are	 more	 likely	 to	 compete	
successfully	with	other	actors	 in	the	system	when	they	are	better	able	to	tailor	
their	 discourse	 so	 as	 to	 present	 themselves	 and	 their	 ideologies	 as	 the	 true	
authentic	 defenders	 of	 the	 nation’s	 unique	 reputation	 for	 democracy,	 diversity	
and	tolerance	(Halikiopoulou	et	al.,	2013).	This	new	‘winning	formula’	utilizes	a	
form	 of	 civic	 nationalism	 that	 mobilizes	 around	 ideology	 rather	 than	 race	
(Halikiopoulou	et	al.,	2013).	This	also	explains	why	these	parties	focus	heavily	on	
Muslims	 –	 regardless	 of	 their	 citizenship	 –	 by	 presenting	 them	 as	 a	 threat	 to	
democratic	 values	 and	 a	 terrorist	 risk.	 It	 is	 an	 important	 observation,	 which	










mostly	 extreme	 right	 variants,	 for	 example	 Jobbik	 in	 Hungary	 and	 Kotleba-
People’s	Party	Our	Slovakia.	Specifically,	such	parties	in	Eastern	Europe	endorse	
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should	 be	 examined	 within	 this	 broader	 context.	 In	 Bulgaria,	 ATAKA	 fits	 the	
Eastern	 European	 trajectory	 discussed	 above.	 The	 party	 portrays	 itself	 as	 a	
Bulgarian	patriotic	party.	It	aspires	to	unite	the	nation	under	the	common	creed	
of	Christianity,	 adopts	an	 irredentist	 rhetoric,	 appeals	 to	economic	nationalism	
calling	 for	 a	 stronger	 role	 of	 the	 state	 in	 the	 economy,	 and	 places	 extensive	
emphasis	 on	 the	 salient	 issue	 of	 ethnic	 minorities.	 The	 party	 also	 places	
extensive	 focus	 on	 corruption	 (Pirro,	 2014).	 ATAKA	 has	 experienced	 steady	
decline,	decreasing	its	support	despite	running	as	a	part	of	a	nationalist	alliance	
with	the	National	Front	for	the	Salvation	for	Bulgaria	and	the	National	Movement	
(IMRO-BNM).	The	picture	 in	 the	Czech	Republic	 is	different:	 the	newly	 formed	






‘right-wing	 populism’	 is	 neither	 a	 uniform,	 new	 nor	 linear	 phenomenon.	 This	
does	not	mean	that	the	electoral	fortunes	of	parties	that	competed	in	the	series	
of	elections	that	took	place	in	2017,	such	as	the	FN,	the	PVV,	the	FPÖ	and	the	AfD	
are	 unimportant.	 On	 the	 contrary:	 the	 FN’s	 33.9%	 in	 the	 second	 round	 of	 the	
French	 presidential	 election	 is	 the	 highest	 percentage	 the	 party	 has	 ever	
received.	The	PVV	and	 the	FPÖ	 increased	 their	 support.	The	biggest	winner	of	
2017	was	perhaps	the	AfD	which	entered	Parliament	 for	 the	 first	 time,	defying	
theories	 suggesting	 that	 parties	 on	 the	 far-right	 end	 of	 the	 political	 spectrum	
have	 limited	 opportunities	 in	 countries	 such	 as	 Germany.	 These	 results	 do	





These	variations	point	 to	 the	 importance	of	 supply-side	dynamics:	while	 social	
discontent	 is	present	 in	all	societies,	support	 for	right-wing	populism	varies.	 In	
other	words,	while	 the	multiple	 insecurities	–	 including	economic,	 cultural	and	
personal	–	that	drive	voters	open	up	opportunities	for	parties	that	operate	in	the	
fringes	 of	 the	 political	 system,	 these	 opportunities	 are	 not	 always	 utilised-	 or	








and	 is	 addressed	 elsewhere	 in	 this	 annual	 review	 issue;	 the	 latter	 is	 the	 ‘new	
winning	formula’	described	above:	i.e.	the	ability	of	these	parties	to	justify	their	




are	better	 equipped	 to	 compete	with	 other	 actors	 in	 the	 system	by	presenting	
themselves	as	legitimate	to	the	electorate.	The	greatest	challenge	is	these	parties’	
ability	 to	 permeate	 mainstream	 ground.	 Accommodating	 such	 parties’	 anti-
immigrant	 positions	 is	 not	 new.	 Anti-immigrant	 parties	 have	 indeed	 had	 a	
contagion	effect	on	other	parties’	 immigration	policy	positions	since	1990	(Van	
Spagne,	 2010).	 What	 is	 new-	 and	 became	 more	 apparent	 during	 the	 various	
electoral	contests	that	took	place	in	2017	across	Europe-	is	the	extent	to	which	
this	 has	 intensified:	 the	 legitimation	 of	 accommodative	 strategies	 is	 making	









































































































































Netherlands	 PVV	 13.1	 20	 2012	 10.08	 15	
Bulgaria	
	






UK	 UKIP	 1.8	 0	 2015	 12.6	 1	
Norway	 Progress	Party	 15.2	 27	 2013	 16.3	 29	
Germany	 AfD	 12.6	 94	 2013	 4.7	 0	
Austria	 FPÖ	 26.0	 51	 2013	 20.51	 40	
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